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WHO OWNS THE AIR?
UNSCRAMBLING THE SATELLITE VIEWING
RIGHTS DILEMMA
I. INTRODUCTION
The newspaper advertisement reads: "Only On Satellite... Over
100 Free Channels-Showtime, Disney, Select TV, The Movie Chan-
nel."' The prospective purchaser of the satellite system is led to believe
that with a one time purchase will come anything and everything that
might travel the airwaves. This poses a yet unsolved problem for the pay
television industry: whether programs that are transmitted by satellites
and other over-the-air technology are fair game to anyone who can inter-
cept them.
What has developed is a modem day "range war," with pay televi-
sion signal providers battling satellite dish owners. Like farmers of the
nineteenth century, pay television companies seek to "fence off" their
property and control the public's access to the satellite signals they send.
Satellite dish owners, like cattlemen, want the "range" open, permitting
access to any signal their satellite dishes can receive. In the middle
stand Congress, the courts and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, acting as sheriff, trying to equitably decide who should prevail. On
the side lines, waiting for the outcome, stand cable television companies
who see their market share being eroded by the satellite industry, and
satellite dish promoters, who want to see their investment in the bur-
geoning industry reach its full potential.
Until recently, this area of pay television communication was regu-
lated under the Communications Act of 1934 (Act).' For many years the
Act, originally intended to regulate broadcasting, was employed to ad-
dress problems that arose in protecting new pay television technology.
In 1984 Congress amended the Act3 to enable the law to more closely
reflect the technology.4 As part of this amendment, Congress attempted
to balance the rights of the parties on all sides of the controversy.
This Comment will examine some of the policy reasons for protect-
1. L. A. Times, Oct. 4, 1985, pt. 3, at 18, col. 5.
2. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1962). There are also state laws which impose both criminal
and civil penalties for illegal signal interception. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 593e (West
Supp. 1986) and discussion infra notes 116-63 and accompanying text.
3. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779.
4. At the same time, the California Legislature was amending California Penal Code
§ 593e.
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ing satellite signals. It will then review how the signals were protected
under the Act before the 1984 amendments, outline the protections and
exemptions prescribed by Congress in the amended Act, and finally look
at the effect of the amendments and examine what Congress or the Fed-
eral Communications Commission intends to do, or should do, to deal
with those effects.
II. EXPLANATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY
Before discussing the legal aspects of satellite technology, it will be
helpful to explain generally how the technology works and to define some
of the terms which will be used throughout this Comment.
A viewer can receive pay television through four basic methods.
The first is Cable Television. Cable Television is a method in which a
signal, dispatched from various sources, is first received by the cable
company's antenna. The company then sends the signal to the individ-
ual's television set through a cable. The signal of cable pay stations, such
as Home Box -Office, is scrambled while the signal of commercial sta-
tions remains unscrambled. A cable subscriber can receive the unscram-
bled pay signal by paying an extra fee.
The second method of reception is Subscription Television (STV).
With STV, the subscription company sends a scrambled or encoded sig-
nal over the air which is received by all television sets. However, the
television set alone cannot decipher the scrambled signal which it re-
ceives. To enable the viewer to decipher the signal, the STV company
leases a decoder to the individual for a subscription fee.
The third method of receiving pay television is through a Multipoint
Distribution System (MDS).5 With this system, signals are received from
a satellite by a MDS station, which then re-transmits the signal omni-
directionally. Individuals within range receive the signal with the aid of
microwave antennas which are often leased from the pay television com-
pany. Signals sent by MDS are of a very high frequency.6 In order for a
normal television set to "understand" the signal, it must first be "down
converted" to a lower frequency. This requires a down converter and a
power supply to operate it, which are both usually supplied by the pay
television company.
Finally, individuals may receive pay television from a Direct Broad-
5. An MDS is a common carrier licensed by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC).
6. MDS signals are transmitted at frequencies of anywhere from 2150 megahertz to 2162
megahertz, as opposed to a normal commercial signal which is transmitted at a frequency
between 54 megahertz and 890 megahertz.
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cast Satellite (DBS). This method uses equipment very similar to the
MDS system, except that the DBS company transmits the signal directly
from a satellite to the viewer, who receives the signal using a satellite dish
antenna. Thus, the DBS system avoids the intervening step of a ground
transmitter. This method is becoming increasingly popular as the prices
for satellite dishes decrease. Satellite dishes are capable of receiving pay
television signals as well as commercial television feeds.7
III. THE POLICY REASONS FOR PROTECTION
OF TELEVISION SIGNALS
The primary question presented is whether television signals should
be protected at all. If signals are going to be protected, one must reach
the conclusion that there is a property right in signals. In order to better
understand the existence of a property right in signals, it will be helpful
to explore the nature of property rights in general. These concepts will
then be applied to television signals to determine what specific rights ex-
ist, why the rights need to exist and to whom these rights belong.
A. The Nature of Property Rights
What are property rights? They are in reality bundles of different
rights. Among them are the right to exclusive possession, the right to do
what one wishes with property and the right to exclude others from using
property or engaging in activity which harms it.
Why are there property rights? Early legal scholars differed respect-
ing how and why property rights existed. Blackstone adopted a doctrine
of a primitive community of goods and declared "that while the earth
continued bare of inhabitants, it is reasonable to suppose that all was
common among them, and everyone took from the public stock to his
own use such things as his immediate necessities required."' In other
words, when there was plenty of everything to go around, there was no
need for property rights. Conversely, others believed that individual
ownership was an inherent right which humans were born with and re-
flected the law of their nature.9 Thus, a classic "chicken or egg" question
is posed: Is protection given because property rights exist, or do prop-
erty rights exist because things need protection?
The theory that property rights are extrinsic found support in Pro-
7. For discussion of an issue relating to the interception of commercial television feeds,
see infra note 190.
8. C. GRAVES, SUMMARY OF TITLE TO PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1 (1897) (citing 2 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 3).
9. Id. (citing 2 J. SCHOULER, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 6 n.2 (2d ed.)).
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fessor Demsetz's work in Toward a Theory of Property Rights. '0 Profes-
sor Demsetz explored the emergence of property rights in society and
noted that new technologies and modes of doing things can have both
harmful and beneficial effects on society.I' For example, the dam which
helps one person cultivate her land will also cut off another's access to
water. Thus, new technologies and their effects will often give rise to
new property rights.
Professor Demsetz examined property rights in land among the
American Indians, I" and found there was a close relationship between
the development of private rights in land and the development of the
commercial fur trade. Before the fur trade developed, hunting was pri-
marily a means for obtaining food. However, as a result of the fur trade,
animal furs became more valuable to the Indians and the scale of hunting
activity increased sharply. This increase in hunting in turn created a
scarcity of animals, resulting in a need for private rights in land. Ani-
mals needed to be husbanded and protected from poachers in order that
the supply would not dwindle to extinction.1 3 Demsetz concluded that
property rights will arise when it becomes economic for people to have
property rights, allowing them to take advantage of their resources in the
most efficient way. These rights will allow property owners to gain the
benefit of acts that affect them or their property and force property users
to bear the burden of those acts.14
The foregoing theory, that property rights are exogenous, mandates
that protection for television signals must be a consequence of an exter-
nal force-the need for protection. If, like the animals of the Indians,
10. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON. REV. 347 (1967).
11. Id. at 350.
12. Id. at 351. Demsetz based his theories on Leacock, The Montagnes "Hunting Terri-
tory" and the Fur Trade, 56 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST, No. 5, pt. 2, Memoir No. 78 and Speck,
The Basis ofAmerican Indian Ownership of Land, OLD PENN WEEKLY REV. Jan. 16, 1915, at
491. These studies examined Indians of the Labrador Peninsula who had a long-established
tradition of property rights in land.
13. Demsetz, supra note 10, at 351-52. For another view of the scarcity issue, see infra
notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
14. Demsetz, supra note 10, at 351-52. Demsetz characterized property rights as arising
when "it becomes economic for those affected by externalities to internalize benefits and
costs." Id. at 354. Demsetz sees externalities as an ambiguous concept that encompasses ex-
ternal costs and external benefits that are non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary. He sees no
harmful or beneficial act as external to the world-there is always someone enjoying the effects
of an act. These effects become "external" when the cost of bringing the effects to bear on the
decisions of the interacting persons is too high to make it worthwhile to internalize them.
"Internalizing" effects is a process, like a change in property rights, that enables the effects in
question to be borne by all of the interacting parties. Id. at 348. Others have tried to explain
externalities in various ways. See W. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS; AN INTRODUCTORY
ANALYSIS 9-11 (1979).
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television signals are an exhaustible resource, these signals are a resource
that must be protected. Therefore, there needs to be some sort of prop-
erty right in the signal. In the case of television signals, the relevant
property right is the right to exclude others or, conversely, the right to be
free from exclusion.15 The determination of this conflict will depend on
how the right is characterized and to whom the right is allocated.
B. Communal Ownership v. Private Ownership
Property rights can be characterized as either communal or pri-
vate.16 Communal ownership guarantees everyone in the defined com-
munity an equal access to the property in question. The community
denies the state or individuals the right to interfere with any one person's
exercise of the communally owned rights. For example, certain types of
water, such as percolating waters, are subject to communal ownership.
Conversely, private ownership recognizes the right of the private owner
to exclude others from exercising the owner's right. 7 An example of this
would be the right to pick fruit off of a tree on one's land or to exclude
others from doing so.
The following illustration makes clear the distinctions between com-
munal and private rights. Assume there is a lake full of fish. Assume
further that the surrounding landowners share equal communal rights in
the lake and the fish, including the right to fish the lake.
If each person wants to receive the maximum benefit of her property
she will attempt to capture as many fish as possible. The assumption
made is that others will absorb the cost of one person's over-fishing by
controlling the amount of fish they take, or by removing no fish at all.
However, if all owners try to "maximize" in the same way, the fish sup-
ply will be rapidly exhausted, leaving the lake of little or no value to
anyone. 18
This result can be averted if all of the owners can agree on a system
for efficient and proportional use. However, there are problems in arriv-
ing at such an agreement. Foremost of these are holdouts who will re-
fuse to agree, believing that they can "ride free" while other owners make
15. This right to be free from exclusion might be characterized as an entitlement. See
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REy. 1089 (1972).
16. Demsetz, supra note 10, at 354. Demsetz also recognizes a third category, state owner-
ship, but does not examine it in detail.
17. Id.
18. "Ruin is the destination to which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a
society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom of the commons brings ruin to
all." Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Sci., Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243.
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sacrifices and compromises. Additionally, assuming that an agreement is
reached, it will be difficult to enforce, to decide who will police it, how it
will be policed and what punishment to impose for non-compliance. Fi-
nally, these owners, in their effort to look out for themselves, may not
take into account the future of the lake beyond their ownership. These
factors represent transaction costs' 9 which may be too high to facilitate
agreement.
Conversely, if the same lake is owned by one private owner, she will
be more likely to take into account both the present and the future of the
resource, because part of the lake's value is in its longevity.20 Since a
private owner knows that the future of the lake is under her control, she
has incentive to invest in the lake and rely on that investment. This high-
lights one of the disadvantages of communal ownership. Because of an
absence of personal future stake, the effect of one person's actions on her
neighbors and on subsequent generations is not taken into account.2 1
When these concepts are applied to television signals it becomes ap-
parent that true communal ownership cannot work. The "supply" of the
product would have to be maintained by the communal owners. No one
person would want to "invest" if she knew that another member of the
commune could deplete the supply without paying. This is what makes
the signals an exhaustible resource. If the signal is like the air, belonging
to the community and available for everyone's use, there must be some
way to pay for, and hence insure, the availability of the resource, or else
the supply will dwindle and die. A communal owner who takes advan-
tage of the product would have to make sure that the product supply is
not depleted.
Those who are of the opinion that the air is free and that the signals,
therefore, should be communal property, assume that an inexhaustible
supply of signals exists. If the supply was unlimited, the problems would
not be so serious. However, the product carried on the signal, the pro-
grams themselves, are expensive to produce and send out. Thus, the sup-
ply is limited. Transaction costs of negotiation, policing and holdouts
make communal ownership of television signals unfeasible. If everyone
is free to snatch out of the air whatever they can get their dishes on, it
19. Professor (now Judge) Posner defines transaction costs simply as "the costs affecting a
transfer of rights." R. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 30 (2d ed. 1979).
20. See Coase, The Nature of the Firm 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
21. Demsetz sees the private owner "as a broker whose wealth depends on how well he
takes into account the competing claims of the present and the future." Demsetz, supra note
10, at 355. There is no broker with communal rights; this gives the present generation too
much influence in how intensely the land is worked. Because future generations have no agent,
there is no one to speak for their rights. Id.
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will no longer be economically efficient to put anything up in the air at
all. Everyone will have access to the lake, but there will be no fish. The
property right in the signal must be a private one.
Thus, it is established that a property right exists and that that right
should be a private right. Next, a critical question arises: To whom
should that property right belong, the sender or the receiver?
C. Allocation of Ownership
1. Ferae naturae-The rule of capture
The average person might contend that even though the right to the
signals is to be a private right, it should still be the private right of any-
one who can receive the signals-like the air we breathe: free to anyone
who can get it into her lungs.22 This instinctual initial reaction to the
issue finds legal roots in the common law notion of ferae naturae. At
common law, for purposes of ownership, animals were classified as either
ferae naturae, those animals which were wild by nature, orferae domitae,
those animals which were by nature tame.23 Animalsferae naturae could
only become property if they were captured and controlled.24 One who
had dominion over such an animal forfeited the qualified ownership to
that property when she lost dominion and returned it to a wild state.25
Thus, a wild animal became the property of anyone who could capture it.
In contrast, an animal domitae was tame and was the absolute property
of the owner regardless of whether there was any exercise of dominion by
the owner.26
Arguably, television signals are analogous to the wild animals de-
scribed above. Like those animals, the signals freely migrate when sent
out, and have no set constraints except those dictated by the nature of
their wavelength. Before the sender transmits the signal she has domin-
ion over it. However, once the signal is transmitted, the sender has no
physical control over it. The sender has, in effect, relinquished dominion
22. This is the opinion of many satellite dish owners. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1986, at 1,
col. 1.
23. See J. SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 64 (5th ed.
1918).
24. Id. at 64-65.
25. See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 16 (2d ed. 1955).
26. See J. SCHOULER, supra note 23, at 64. The rationale for this concept was that all
animals in nature had a natural state of liberty. If man takes this liberty away, and the animal
is compelled to servitude, this natural liberty is suppressed but not extinguished. Therefore,
the property right is qualified. Conversely, a tame animal was considered to have voluntarily
surrendered its liberty, thereupon becoming the subject of absolute ownership. Id. at 65.
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and control over the signal. This would mean that the "freed" signal
should now be the property of whoever can capture it.
There are two reasons why this analysis is not valid. First, television
signals may be uncontrollable waves, but they are waves that carry con-
tent. It is impossible to separate waves themselves from what is carried
over them. At common law, it was possible for an animalferae naturae
to be tamed, converting it to a animal domitae z7 Arguably, the content
of the signals "tames" them. The signals are thus analagous to domesti-
cated animals and remain the property of the original owner no matter
where they wander and no matter who captures them.
Alternatively, even if the signals are considered "wild," another
broadcast practice may remove them from the concept offerae naturae.
This practice is scrambling, whereby the transmitter distorts the normal
signal in such a way that the normal television set cannot understand it.
By scrambling a signal the sender has arguably retained dominion and
control because in theory, only those who have the sender's permission
may receive the intelligible signal. The "animal" is on a long leash, still
controlled by the owner.28 Because the signal has not been indiscrimi-
nately released into the air, it is still the property of the sender.2 9
The foregoing analysis illustrates that ancient concepts are some-
times inadequate to deal with modern problems.30 There must be an al-
ternative way to allocate the property right in the signal.
2. An economic approach to allocation
An economic approach to allocation would vest the property right
where it can be most efficiently used. Ronald Coase believed that in a
world with zero transaction costs it would not matter to whom an initial
property right is given." The party to whom it was most valuable would
ultimately gain control of the property and use it in the most efficient
way.
32
For example, A owns a farm that has a yearly profit of ten dollars
27. See F. CHILDS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 127 (1914).
28. This is a strong argument in favor of the scrambling of signals. See discussion infra
note 168 and accompanying text.
29. There is another possible argument why the concept offerae naturae does not apply to
the signals. One explanation for the development offerae naturae is perhaps necessity. There
was no way to identify the wild animals so it made sense to allow the animals to be the prop-
erty of whoever had dominion over them. This same rationale does not apply to television
signals since there is no problem in identifying the sender of the signal.
30. See Tunick & Schechter, State Taxation of Computer Programs: Tangible or Intangi-
ble? 63 TAXES 54 (1985).
31. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. I (1960).
32. Id. at 15.
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and B is a cattle rancher who makes a profit of one hundred dollars an-
nually. B's cattle must cross A's farm, and in doing so ruin all of A s
crops. If A has the right to exclude B, A will make his ten dollars but B
will lose his hundred dollars, resulting in a net loss of ninety dollars. If B
can pay A ten dollars for the right to cross A's farm A will be compen-
sated for the loss of the crops and B will still make one hundred dollars,
resulting in a net gain of ninety dollars. Thus, even if the right is initially
given to A, it will eventually end up with B because that is where it can
be used most efficiently. Unfortunately, as even Coase admits,33 a world
with zero transaction costs is unrealistic. If A knows that B stands to
lose one hundred dollars, A can hold out for more than the ten dollars
that will be lost, thus throwing the efficiency out of balance. To prevent
inefficiency, sometimes decisions must be made as to where and to whom
a right should be vested.
Like the decision that must be made with the cattle, whether to let
the cattle cross then pay or pay to cross, a choice must be made whether
to allow the recipient of a television signal to receive then pay or pay to
receive. The former option, reception first-payment second, allocates
the property right to the receiver of the signal, giving that receiver a right
to receive any signal which is put into the air. As the lake and fish anal-
ogy illustrates,34 this might not be efficient since the receiver is less likely
to pay for and replenish the supply of the product. Because the receiver
is not going to actually put programs in the air, the only feasible way to
replenish the supply is to require payment for the service. If the right is
vested in the receiver and payment is necessary, in the absence of some
sort of pay-per-view technology, paying for the programs would have to
be on an honor system-a system that, in light of "free riders," would
not seem to be very efficient. Thus, a more feasible option must be found.
This option is to allocate the right to the sender, who is more likely
to ensure that it is used efficiently. Thus, it becomes clear that there is a
property right, and that the right is a private one that is most efficiently
allocated to the sender. However, problems may arise in enforcing this
right. Technological advances make it easy for anyone with a dish to
intercept transmissions. Thus, there may be an imperfect appropriability
of rights. This means that, for a variety of reasons, a property owner is
either unable to use her property in the best way or exclude someone else
from using it.36 Appropriability may be imperfect because of technologi-
33. Id.
34. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
36. See W. HIRSCH, supra note 14, at 21.
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cal or other characteristics of the rights in question. The ease of recep-
tion of the signal by satellite dishes makes the property right in the signal
difficult to protect in turn creating an imperfect appropriability of the
right.
The foregoing discussion has described a right which appears to
bounce back and forth between sender and receiver. At first glance the
ownership right is seen as belonging to everyone. However, principles of
economic efficiency indicate that this does not make sense and that the
right should be vested in an individual-the signal's sender. However,
technology creates an imperfect appropriability of rights because the ease
of interception of the signal in effect reallocates the rights to the receiver.
When this imperfect appropriability occurs, outside forces, such as the
courts or the legislature, must act to ensure the right is once again dis-
tributed efficiently. As one court noted: "[A]lithough the public owns
the airwaves, Congress. . .[is] charged with regulating them in the pub-
lic interest. That interest would seemingly not be served by the demise of
a product for which there is clearly considerable consumer demand."37 A
middle ground must be found which will balance the competing interests
of the receiver, who wants the right of access, and the sender, who wants
the right to be compensated.
The following sections examine how Congress and the courts have
attempted, or are attempting, to balance these concerns and allocate the
rights involved.
IV. THE ACT OF 1934
The Communications Act of 1934 (Act) provided television signals
with their first protection. 38 The Act was originally enacted to serve nu-
merous purposes. First, Congress wanted broad regulation of foreign
and interstate commerce in communication by wire and radio.39 More-
over, Congress intended to establish a rapid, efficient nationwide and
worldwide communication service that would furnish adequate facilities
at reasonable prices for the purpose of securing national defense, and to
centralize authority that had previously rested in various separate agen-
cies.4 The Act also created the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) empowering it to enforce the Act and its provisions.
37. National Subscription Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1981).
38. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609
(1962)).
39. For an excellent discussion of the history of the Act and its original purposes, see
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
40. Pub. L. No. 73-416, tit. I, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
[Vol. 20:145
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A. The Language of Section 605
Section 605 of the Act stated in part:
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any radio communication and divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purpose, effect or communication of such
intercepted communication to any person. No person not be-
ing entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any...
communication by radio and use such communication. . . for
his own benefit or for the benefit of another. . . .This section
shall not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing or utiliz-
ing the contents of any radio communication which is transmit-
ted. . . for use of the general public .... 1
The purpose of section 605 was to protect certain private communi-
cations, such as governmental and ship-to-ship communications, from
being intercepted.42 Thus, section 605 expressly stated that its provisions
did not apply to communications intended for the general public.
With the growth of the pay television industry, a necessity arose for
protection of its product. Pay television companies needed protection
from interceptors and courts saw section 605 as providing a legal basis
for that protection. Conversely, interceptors sought to establish loop-
holes in section 605 which would enable them to receive pay television
signals for free.
B. Case Law Under Section 605
1. The "broadcast proviso" exemption
Most cases which challenged the protection of pay television signals
under the Act focused on the claim that pay television was "broadcast-
ing" under the Act and therefore not protected. The broadcast proviso
of the Act stated that section 605 would "not apply . . . to any...
communication which is transmitted. . . for the use of the general pub-
lic. . .. " As stated above," it was originally the privacy interest in
41. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1962), amended by 47 U.S.C. § 705(a) (Supp. 1986) (emphasis
added).
42. For an excellent legislative history of § 605 see Home Box Office v. Advanced Con-
sumer Technology, 549 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). It is interesting to note that one of the
original purposes of § 605 was to protect private radio signals. This protection is analogous to
the protection of private telephone signals. Individuals have little problem accepting this pro-
tection even though these signals travel over the same "private" air. This must mean that the
"air" is only "free" if there are no competing interests to dictate otherwise.
43. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1962), amended by 47 U.S.C. § 705(a) (Supp. 1986).
44. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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certain government communications that gave rise to the protections of
section 605, and any "broadcast" for the general public was beyond the
scope of that policy.
Orth-O-Vision Inc. v. Home Box Office45 was the first case to
squarely address the broadcast exemption problem. Home Box Office
(HBO) had contracted with Orth-O-Vision to function as a middleman in
furnishing HBO programming to residents of apartment buildings.46 Af-
ter a stormy relationship in which contracts were rescinded and renegoti-
ated, and in which payments to HBO were not made, HBO terminated
the agreement. However, because HBO could not physically prevent
Orth-O-Vision from receiving the signal, Orth-O-Vision continued mar-
keting HBO's programming to the apartments.47 HBO sought an injunc-
tion restraining Orth-O-Vision from appropriating its programming,
claiming that section 605 prohibited Orth-O-Vision's acts.48
A principal issue in the case involved whether "HBO's. . . commu-
nications [were] 'broadcast', i.e., intended to be received by the general
public and, therefore, exempted from the protection of § 605."14 HBO
argued that its intent to limit the audience to only those who paid a fee
indicated that the signal was not broadcast. Orth-O-Vision, responding
to this contention, asserted that since the HBO programs were "of inter-
est" to the general public they were "broadcasting" intended for the gen-
eral public.
The Orth-O-Vision court sought to define what constituted "broad-
casting" under section 605. Although there were no decisions directly
addressing the issue, the court examined two sources it found persuasive.
The first was Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC.5 0 Functional Music in-
volved a pay radio system in which the subscribers received a device
which could delete all commercials from the programming. The Func-
tional Music court held that program specialization was determinative of
intent to broadcast to the general public.5 According to the court,
"[b]roadcasting remains broadcasting even though a segment of those ca-
pable of receiving the broadcast signal are equipped to delete a portion of
45. 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
46. Id. at 675.
47. Id. at 675-78.
48. Id. at 677-78.
49. Id. at 681.
50. 274 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959). The Functional
Music court overruled an FCC determination which reasoned that because the service's format
was highly specialized, directly adaptable to subscriber needs and it was charged for, it was not
broadcasting. See infra note 59.
51. Id. at 548.
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that signal." 2 The service was of general interest to the "general" radio
audience and, therefore, a broadcast.-
3
The second precedent examined by the Orth-O-Vision court was an
FCC decision which had considered whether intent to limit the scope of
the transmission of a subscription television signal meant that the signal
was not "broadcast."54 The FCC had rejected the contention that limit-
ing transmission to those individuals willing to pay could exempt the
transmission from the definition of "broadcasting."55 Relying on these
decisions, the Orth-O-Vision court concluded that HBO's programs,
which differed little from conventional broadcast fare, were obviously in-
tended to appeal to a mass audience. Therefore, HBO transmissions con-
stituted broadcasting to the general public and were not within the
protection of section 605. As a result, Orth-O-Vision was free to inter-
cept the signals.
5 6
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the same issue a year
later in Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook.5" Chartwell, a
provider of STV service, sought to enjoin defendants from selling de-
coder boxes which could unscramble the STV signal which was received
by all televisions. The Chartwell court defined broadcasting as "dissemi-
nation of radio communications intended to be received by the public,
directly or by the intermediary of relay stations."5 8 In confronting the
issue of whether STV constituted broadcasting for the purposes of sec-
tion 605, the court refused to follow the Orth-O- Vision court's reasoning.
The Sixth Circuit first considered and distinguished Functional Mu-
sic. 9 The court noted that Functional Music had overruled an earlier
FCC determination that FM stations with electronically deleted com-
mercials were not broadcasting.6" The Chartwell court distinguished the
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Radio
Broadcast Serv.) To Provide For Subscription Television Serv., 3 F.C.C.2d 1 (1966) [hereinaf-
ter Amendment for Subscription Television Serv.].
55. The FCC stated:
The evident intention of any station transmitting subscription programs would be to
make them available to all members of the public within range of the station. ...
E [I]ntent" may be inferred from the circumstances under which material is
transmitted, and . . . the number of actual or potential viewers is not especially
important.
Id. at 9.
56. Orth-O-Vision, 474 F. Supp. at 682.
57. 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980).
58. Id. at 462 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1962)).
59. Id. at 463.
60. Id. See, e.g., In re Amendment of Parts 2, 3, and 4 of the Commission's Rules and
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case, noting that the main reason for the finding of broadcasting in Func-
tional Music was that Functional Music had intended its programming
for the general public, and that the general public had received most of
the programming-the specialized subscribers only got less of what was
offered to the general public.6'
The Chartwell court then analyzed the FCC determination upon
which the Orth-O-Vision court had relied.62 It noted the context in
which this determination had been made. Specifically, the FCC rendered
its decision in response to television networks which did not want sub-
scription television signals carried over channels meant for broadcast-
ing.63 Although the networks claimed that subscription television was
not broadcasting, the FCC decided that intent to provide service without
discrimination to as many members of the general public as can be inter-
ested in the particular program was broadcasting.' The Chartwell court
held that the FCC had not decided whether subscription television was
broadcasting for the purposes of section 605.65 Unlike the Orth-O- Vision
court, Chartwell did not read the FCC decision out of context.66
The Chartwell court found support for its conclusion in KMLA
Broadcast Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vending Corp.67 KMLA
was an early case dealing with the question of whether a radio communi-
cation was broadcasting for the purposes of section 605. The court in
KMLA agreed with the FCC determination which Functional Music had
overruled. 68 The FCC had found that subscription services that could
not be received by the general public without the aid of special equip-
ment were not broadcasting and thus were protected by section 605.69
Since viewing STV required special equipment, Chartwell argued that
Regulations and the Standards of Good Eng' Practice Concerning FM Broadcast Stations to
Permit FM Broadcast Stations to Engage in Specified Non-Broadcasting Activities on a Sim-
plex and/or Multiplex Basis, 44 F.C.C. 1010 (1955) (FCC allowed an FM station to broadcast
functional music even though the FCC did not consider such music broadcasting).
61. Chartwell, 637 F.2d at 463.
62. Id. at 464. See Amendment for Subscription Television Serv., supra note 54.
63. Chartwell, 637 F.2d at 464.
64. Amendment for Subscription Television Serv., supra note 54, at 8-1I.
65. Chartwell, 637 F.2d at 464.
66. Id. The court stated that even if the FCC had determined that STV was broadcasting
and not protectable by § 605, it was not bound by the FCC's determination. Id. at 464-65.
The court noted that Functional Music had overruled a prior FCC decision. Id. at 465.
67. 264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967). KMLA provided background music to subscribers
on a frequency which could not be picked up by a normal radio. KMLA provided equipment
to subscribers allowing them to receive the transmissions. The defendant in the case provided
similar equipment to establishments which would house defendant's cigarette machines.
68. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
69. KMLA, 264 F. Supp. at 40.
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the court should follow the reasoning of KMLA and hold that the sub-
scription television signals were not "broadcast" and therefore were pro-
tected by section 605.70 The Chartwell court agreed, reasoning that while
STV might be available to the general public, "it is intended for the ex-
clusive use of paying subscribers . . . [and] not broadcasting intended
for use by the general public within the meaning of. . . Section 605."
7 1
Thus, the STV signals were within the protection of section 605.72
The same "broadcast" challenge was levied at MDS signals in Movie
Systems v. Heller.73 The defendant, Heller, had installed his own antenna
and down converter which allowed him to receive plaintiff's entertain-
ment programming. The plaintiff detected the interception and brought
suit under section 605, when Heller failed to pay a subscription fee. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision to
grant the plaintiff summary judgment and enjoined Heller from inter-
cepting the programs. 74 Disregarding Heller's claims that Orth-O- Vision
controlled, the court instead followed the reasoning of Chartwell and
held that the "MDS transmissions [were] not broadcasting for the use of
the general public and thus section 605 prohibit[ed] unauthorized inter-
ception of the MDS signal."
75
Thus, with the exception of a district court opinion in the Second
Circuit, all three courts of appeals which addressed the question held
that pay television signals were not broadcasting for the purposes of sec-
tion 605.76 This possible loophole in the statute was, for all practical
70. Chartwell, 637 F.2d at 464. Chartwell also asked the court to follow Home Box Office
v. Pay TV of Greater New York, 467 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (an unauthorized recep-
tion of an MDS signal was violation of § 605). According to the Chartwell court, the court in
Home Box Office must have assumed that MDS was not broadcasting in order to find that
there had been a violation. Chartwell, 637 F.2d at 464 n.3.
71. Chartwell, 637 F.2d at 465 (emphasis in original).
72. Id. at 466. Shortly thereafter, this holding was followed by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in National Subscription Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981).
73. 710 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983).
74. Id. at 495.
75. Id. The Heller court did not agree with Orth-O-Vision's reliance on the "mass appeal
of programming" analysis in determining whether the programming is broadcast. Id. See also
American Television & Communications Corp. v. Western Techtronics, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 617
(D. Colo. 1982).
76. See Chartwell (6th Cir.), supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text; Heller (8th Cir.),
supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text; National Subscription Television (9th Cir.), supra
note 71. This leaves Orth-O-Vision, a district court case, as the only real contrary authority.
Perhaps it is possible to distinguish that decision as the court did in Home Box Office v. Ad-
vanced Consumer Technology, 549 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The court there noted that
the Orth-O-Vision court's holding that HBO programs were intended to be received by the
general public was "unnecessary to its disposition of the case." Id. at 24. This is perhaps
true-the court in Orth-O-Vision enjoined the defendant from retransmitting HBO's signals
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purposes, closed and senders of the signals had continued protection of
their property right.
2. Allowing for a private right of action
Another issue important to the protection of signals was whether
section 605 afforded a private right of action. An allocation of any right
is not worth much without the ability to enforce it. In addressing this
issue, the Chartwell court applied the Supreme Court's analysis from
Cort v. Ash. 7 7 Cort considered whether violation of a criminal statute by
a corporation allowed a shareholder a private right of action against the
corporation. In determining whether a private right of action may be
implied from a federal statute, the Supreme Court articulated a four-part
test:
(1) Does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff?
(2) Is there any indication of legislative intent to create or deny
a private remedy?
(3) Is a private remedy consistent with the underlying purpose
of the legislation?
(4) Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state
law?
The Chartwell court applied this test to section 605.78 The court
found that because section 605 protected those who communicate by ra-
dio from having their communications intercepted by other persons, a
federal right was created in favor of Chartwell.79 Although legislative
history was silent on the question of intent to create or deny a private
remedy, the court found that a private remedy was clearly consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislation.80 According to the
court, if section 605 did not confer an implied private cause of action,
parties to communications would have no means of protecting them-
selves from unauthorized interception; a private remedy was necessary to
ensure adequate enforcement of the statute.8' The court also noted that
the regulation of radio and television had long been an area of federal
based on a copyright claim; therefore there was no reason for the plaintiff to appeal. See Orth-
0-Vision, 474 F. Supp. at 685-86. It should also be noted that National Subscription Television
reversed the lower court decision which had specifically relied on Orth-O-Vision.
77. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
78. Chartwell, 637 F.2d at 466.
79. Id. The court cited a long line of precedent finding an implied right of action under
§ 605 and saw no reason to deviate. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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concern and not one relegated to state law.8" The Chartwell court con-
cluded that the plaintiff had a private right of action based on section
605.83
Thus, at the time Congress decided to amend the Act, the courts
had interpreted section 605, which had been enacted before the advent of
pay television technology, to protect the pay television signals. The
Courts of Appeals in the Sixth, Eighth, and" Ninth Circuits found pay
television signals not to be "broadcasting" for the purposes of section 605
and, therefore, protected from unlawful signal interception. Courts had
also given signal senders a means to enforce the protection by allowing a
private right of action. With the exception of one district court opinion,
the courts had engaged in a judicial allocation of rights and, had vested
the property right in the sender of the signal. Although the courts did
not express their analysis in those terms, this allocation seemed to be the
most efficient way to allocate the rights.
V. CURRENT PROTECTION OF PAY TELEVISION SIGNALS
A. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
During the early 1980s, Congress realized that the Act could no
longer accommodate the changes in cable television technology and its
related industries. In 1984, Congress enacted the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act).8 4 The Cable Act's main goal was to
establish a national policy consolidating the then existing system of local,
state and federal regulation of cable television. By enacting the Cable
Act, Congress sought to deal with the regulation, franchising and pro-
gramming of cable television. 6 The Cable Act also addressed the need
to regulate competing technologies such as MDS, DBS and STV.87
1. Section 705(b)-the narrow exception
The Cable Act amended section 605 of the 1934 Act and
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 601-611 (Supp.
1985)).
85. H.R. Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4656.
86. One of the main concerns of Congress was that the bidding wars that had occurred
during the cable boom would not recur when franchise agreements expired or new agreements
were sought. Id. at 4659.
87. Id. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text for an explanation of the various
technologies.
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redesignated it as section 705.88 The amendment acknowledged the prac-
tice of individuals intercepting satellite-delivered programming for pri-
vate use.89 Section 705(a) merely recodified section 605; Congress
intended that all of the case law developed under section 605 remain
undisturbed.90 However, Congress added a new provision. Section
705(b) of the Cable Act provides that the protections given to parties
under section 705(a) (former section 605)
shall not apply to the interception or receipt by any individual,
or the assisting (including the manufacture or sale) of such in-
terception or receipt, of any satellite cable programming for
private viewing if-
(1) the programming involved is not encrypted; and
(2)(A) a marketing system is not established under which-
(i) an agent or agents have been lawfully designated for the
purpose of authorizing private viewing by individuals, and
(ii) such authorization is available to the individual in-
volved from the appropriate agent or agents; or
(B) a marketing system described in subparagraph (A) is es-
tablished and the individuals receiving such programming has
[sic] obtained such authorization for private viewing under that
system. 9'
According to Congress, section 705(b) is intended to prescribe "a
very limited exception to liability. . . enabl[ing] an individual to receive
authorization to intercept or receive satellite cable programming that is
unencrypted ... "92
Thus, under the Cable Act, scrambled signals will always be pro-
tected. However, unscrambled signals are protected only if the sender of
the signal creates a valid system whereby the signal is marketed.
93
Congress created this exception for unscrambled signals in response
to the recognition that many Americans who live in rural or out of the
way locations do not have access to the programs that cable subscribers
88. Some cases decided after the amendment still refer to § 705 as § 605. See infra note
114.
89. Explanation of Section 705 as Redesignated and Amended by H.R. 4103, 130 CONG.
REC. H12237 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
90. See 130 CONG. REC. S14286-87 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Packwood), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4746.
91. 47 U.S.C. § 705(a) (Supp. 1985).
92. 130 CONG. REC. S14287 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood), re-
printed in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4747.
93. For a discussion of what this "valid" system might entail, see infra notes 164-68 and
accompanying text.
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receive. Congress noted that every month thousands of persons purchase
satellite dishes because that is their only way to view these programs.
94
Section 705(b) seeks to protect these people95 and at the same time pro-
tect the companies which provide the pay television services.
The mechanism by which the companies can protect themselves
under section 705(b) is founded on a market control theory.96 If a com-
pany chooses not to scramble or encrypt its signal97 it must create some
sort of "marketing system." Although the legislative history does not
describe "system," or how it should work, the plan must be developed in
good faith and must actually provide access to the satellite dish owners.98
It cannot be a sham or an avoidance scheme designed to deny individuals
the opportunity to view the programming.99 If a marketing plan is put
into effect, the viewer must seek and obtain authorization to view the
programs or else risk liability under section 705(a). If a pay television
company does not choose the "scrambling" option or the "marketing"
option, the owner of the satellite dish will be free to intercept the signals
without incurring liability.1" Thus, in effect, Congress has taken a slice
out of the property right of the sender and reallocated it to the receiver.
Congress was very careful to keep the "slice" limited, stating that
"[t]he interception of the 'satellite cable programming' must in fact be
directly from the satellite feed in order to come within the terms of the
94. 130 CONG. REc. H10443 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Gore). Represen-
tative Gore of Tennessee predicted "that before the end of the century this method of receiving
television signals is going to be a technology of choice." Id.
95. Senator Goldwater believed that "individuals sitting in their own dwelling units have
the right to receive unscrambled satellite-transmitted television signals falling on their dwell-
ings and to view the programming offered by such signals." 130 CONG. REC. S14283 (daily ed.
Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater). The Senator believed that this new industry,
which originated in rural America, was encouraged and fostered by numerous small manufac-
turers and dealers willing to take a risk on a new and untried venture. He felt that "[i]f our
Nation is to hold its lead in this and other areas of high technology, we must encourage this
type of initiative" and not favor one technology over another which would have the effect of
stifling excellent products. Id.
96. See infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
97. The explanation to § 705 states:
One of the underlying premises of the subsection (b) exemption is that the market-
place is fully capable of reaching, without any government intervention, a solution to
the problem of unauthorized interception and receipt of encrypted satellite cable pro-
gramming. . . . [A]ccordingly, the narrow exception . . . applies only to . . .re-
ceipt or interruption [of] unencrypted or unaltered satellite cable programming.
130 CONG. REC. H12237-38 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
98. 130 CONG. REC. H10446 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Tanzin).
99. Id. For a discussion of what this marketing plan might entail, see infra notes 164-69
and accompanying text.
100. Perhaps Congress' logic was that the pay television companies would be less likely to
market in the rural areas, thereby allowing rural individuals access to the signal.
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exemption to liability set forth in subsection (b)."' 01 It was stressed that
if signals were intercepted from MDS or STV systems, liability would
apply regardless of whether those controlling the programming estab-
lished a system under subsection (b)(2).'1 2 This would be consistent with
Congress' interest in protecting the rural viewers. If a STV or a MDS
signal is intercepted, it must mean that the signal is being transmitted
close to the area of the interception, since these are only short range
systems. If this is so, there must be some other way, besides a satellite
dish, for the viewer to receive the signal. Thus, there should be no un-
restricted right to access to these signals and no reason for the sender to
establish a marketing system-because presumably there is one.
Thus, the activity in Chartwell Communications Group v. West-
brook, the interception of MDS signals, which was found to be a viola-
tion of section 605, would also be a violation under the newly enacted
Cable Act.
a. federal interpretation of section 705(b)
The only federal case to consider the exception of 705(b) is Air Capi-
tal Cablevision, Inc. v. Starlink Communications Group, Inc. 10 3 In Air
Capital, two cable television companies sued a distributor of earth station
satellite antennae claiming an unlawful interception of satellite signals.'°4
The defendant, Starlink, moved for a partial summary judgment on the
grounds that, because it had intercepted unscrambled programming di-
rectly from a satellite, it was exempted from liability by section 705(b).10
The court relied on the language and legislative history of section
705(b)' 016 and concluded that it was crystal clear that the 1984 amend-
101. 130 CONG. REc. H12238 (daily ed. Oct. I1, 1984) (emphasis added). See also 47
U.S.C. § 705(c) (Supp. 1985) which states: "For purposes of this section-(1) the term 'satel-
lite cable programming' means video programming which is transmitted via satellite and
which is primarily intended for the direct receipt by cable operators for their retransmission to
cable subscribers."
102. 130 CONG. REc. H12238 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
103. 601 F. Supp. 1568 (D. Kan. 1985). One recent case arising under § 705 did not ad-
dress the exception. See ON/TV of Chicago v. Julien, 763 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1985). In ONI
TV, the defendant was accused of advertising and selling "decoder kits" to unscramble a STV
signal which came directly through the television on a UHF channel. The court found that the
signal was not broadcast, relying on the reasoning ofHeller, Chartwell and National Subscrip-
tion TV. Id. at 843-44.
104. This is exactly the situation that the § 705(b) exception was designed to cover. Con-
gressman Rose of North Carolina even mentioned the case in discussions of the amendment on
the House floor. See 130 CONG. REC. H10446 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Rose).
105. Air Capital, 601 F. Supp. at 1569.
106. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
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ments were enacted specifically to protect enterprises, such as Starlink,
which sell satellite dishes. 0 7 The court distinguished the case from those
in which decoders are used to intercept STV,1°8 and those in which mi-
crowave antennae and down converters are used to intercept MDS sig-
nals10 9 and granted Starlink's motion for summary judgment.
110
b. California interpretation of section 705(b)
The California Court of Appeal was called on to interpret section
705 in California Satellite Systems v. Nichols." I There, defendants sold
equipment used to intercept a pay television signal. Unlike Starlink, the
signal in question was intercepted from a MDS station on the ground on
its way to subscribers' homes. 2 Plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendants
from making and selling the equipment used to receive the signal. The
court held that defendants' assisting in the interception of MDS signals
neither fell within the broadcast proviso exception of 705(a)" 3 nor the
narrow satellite reception exception of section 705(b),' 14 and granted an
107. Air Capital, 601 F. Supp. at 1571.
108. See, e.g., National Subscription TV v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981);
Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980).
109. Air Capital, 601 F. Supp. at 1571. See, eg., Movie Sys. v. Heller, 710 F.2d 492 (8th
Cir. 1983).
110. Air Capital, 601 F. Supp. at 1572. The court also addressed the issue of Air Capital's
standing to sue under § 705. In doing so it identified two separate rights. First was the right
to manufacture, sell, distribute and use equipment that enables a home viewer to receive the
vast number of programs transmitted via satellite. Second, the court recognized the right of a
cable television programming distributor, who has a license from a program producer such as
HBO, to retransmit to subscribers for a fee. Id. at 1571. The fact that a cable company has
the right to retransmit does not give it the exclusive right to receive the signal from the satel-
lite. Since the signal had been intercepted before Air Capital had received it, the court held
that Air Capital had no standing to sue under the Cable Act. Id.
The court did not address the question of whether a company like HBO, who sent the
intercepted signal, would have had standing in this case. The court's reasoning indicated that
HBO would have had standing to challenge the interception and that the marketing plan re-
quirement would apply. This reasoning forces a company like Air Capital to have its supplier
(e.g., HBO) sue to protect its interests and the right for which it has paid. This analysis of the
two property rights is erroneous. An exclusive license to transmit the signal should carry with
it the right to exclude others from receiving the signal. Otherwise, the license is not worth
much.
111. 170 Cal. App. 3d 56, 216 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1985).
112. Id. at 62, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
113. Id. at 69, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 185-86. The court looked at the intent of the programmers
instead of the character of the programming to determine that the signal was not a broadcast
intended for the general public.
114. Id. at 68, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 186. Here the court applied newly amended § 705(b) but
still called it § 605. All references will be to § 705. The court found that the narrow exception
of § 705(b) applies only to signals intercepted directly from the satellite. Since the signal in
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injunction. a15
Thus, between Starlink and Nichols, the courts seem to have out-
lined the parameters of protection and exemption for satellite signals
under section 705. The signal is protected if it is from STV or MDS, or if
it is scrambled, or if it is unscrambled and the pay television company
develops and institutes a system to market the signal. A satellite dish
owner may receive an unscrambled signal if it comes directly from the
satellite and the receiver pays for the signal-if the signal is marketed by
the pay television company. There is still some question as to who has
standing to assert a private right of action for an unlawful interception of
the signal.
B. State Protection of Signals-People v. Babylon & California Penal
Code Section 593e
Recently, some states have enacted laws which are intended to sup-
plement federal protection of pay television signals. One of these states is
California, which enacted Penal Code section 593e. 116 Originally en-
acted in 1980, section 593e sought to protect pay television companies
from theft of service. The section, which like the Communications Act,
was amended in 1984, prohibits attaching, manufacturing or selling de-
vices to intercept or decode transmissions by subscription television serv-
ices.' 17 The purpose of the amendment, as State Senator Montoya
stated, was to raise the amount of the fine, to impose criminal penalties
for the unauthorized attachment of equipment to a television set for the
purpose of unauthorized interception, and to create a civil remedy for the
subscription television system."1 " The amended statute reads in part:
question was intercepted from a MDS station on the ground, the defendants did not fall within
the exception.
115. Id. at 72-73, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 189. The court rejected defendants' claim that plain-
tiff's cause of action was based on copyright law and was therefore preempted by the Copy-
right Act. Although one section of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982), concerns
preemption, the court interpreted it to deal only with preemption of state laws, holding that
nothing in the Copyright Act limited any other federal statute. 170 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 216
Cal. Rptr. at 184. The court also relied on earlier decisions, such as Chartwell, and held that
§ 705 afforded a private right of action. Id. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
The court reasoned that, in the absence of any express language giving federal courts jurisdic-
tion, actions arising under § 705 could be brought in state court. 170 Cal. App. 3d at 66, 216
Cal. Rptr. at 184-85. The court also examined the language of the amended act which stated
that an action could be brought in a United States District Court or any other court of compe-
tent jurisdiction. Id.
116. CAL. PENAL CODE § 593e (West Supp. 1985). See also, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:222 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
117. CAL. PENAL CODE § 593e (West 1980) (amended 1984).
118. Cal. S.B. 387, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. (1984).
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(a) Every person who knowingly and willfully makes or main-
tains an unauthorized connection. . . or. . .assists others in
or maintains the attachment of any unauthorized device or de-
vices to a television set . . . for the purpose of intercepting,
receiving or using any. . . service carried by the subscription
television system which the person is not authorized by that
subscription television system to receive or use, is guilty of a
misdemeanor ...
(b) Every person who, without the express authorization of a
subscription television system, knowingly and willfully manu-
factures, imports into this state, assembles, distributes, sells, of-
fers to sell, possesses, advertises for sale . . . any device...
designed in whole or part to decode, descramble, intercept, or
otherwise make intelligible any encoded, scrambled or other
nonstandard signal. . . is guilty of a misdemeanor. 1 9
The following discussion of a recent application of section 593e, as
amended, will illustrate the differences between the state and the federal
law.
1. People v. Babylon: The amendment applied?
The California Supreme Court interpreted the newly amended sec-
tion 593e in People v. Babylon.12 There, the defendants were accused of
selling devices to be used for the unauthorized reception of an over-the-
air transmission that was broadcast by a company called Sacramento
Microband (Microband). 121 Microband was a licensed MDS that trans-
mitted Home Box Office (HBO) for California Satellite Systems (CAL-
SAT). CALSAT was the exclusive licensee for HBO in the Sacramento
area.122 HBO transmitted the program signal by satellite to Microband
which in turn sent out the signal omni-directionally. CALSAT leased a
microwave antenna, an amateur down converter, and a power supply to
each member of the public who wished to see the programming and
charged an installation fee and a monthly fee for the personal use of the
service. 
123
On December 10, 1980, an inspector approached defendant Babylon
and attempted to purchase an "HBO system."' 24 Babylon told the in-
119. CAL. PENAL CODE § 593e (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
120. 39 Cal. 3d 719, 702 P.2d 205, 216 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1985).
121. Id. at 723, 702 P.2d at 207-08, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
122. Id. at 723, 702 P.2d at 208, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 724, 702 P.2d at 208, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
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spector that he was not allowed to sell systems for HBO use and he
would not sell the system if "told" that such would be the purpose of its
use. 125 Babylon was asked what other programs the system would re-
ceive and he replied that the only signal received "around here" was
HBO, and then demonstrated and sold the inspector a dish antenna, a
down converter and a power supply. 26 Babylon was issued a citation for
a violation of section 593e.1
27
On December 15, 1980, another inspector approached defendant
Hyatt and purchased all of the equipment for a "system."'' 2 At the pro-
posed site of the installation, Hyatt told the investigators that he was
installing the equipment in a way that would receive HBO and that re-
ceiving HBO was the intended use of the system.129 Both of the defend-
ants later stipulated that they knew the equipment was capable of
receiving the HBO signal from Microband and that it would be used for
that purpose. They also stipulated that they did not have CALSAT's
permission to sell the equipment for profit.'
The court of appeal reversed the lower court's finding that section
593e was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as it applied to the de-
fendants.' The California Supreme Court granted a hearing.
During the pendency of the appeal, the California legislature
amended section 593e.' 3 2 The original appeal was based on the theory
that section 593e as enacted in 1980 was ambiguous and overbroad and
was preempted by the Communications Act of 1934.133 The California
Supreme Court concluded that it need not address either of these issues
but should reverse because the new section did not proscribe the defend-
ants' activities.1
3 4
The court looked at the language in the amended statute which pro-
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 723, 702 P.2d at 208-09, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
129. Id. at 723, 702 P.2d at 209, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
130. Id.
131. People v. Babylon, 146 Cal. App. 3d 386, 194 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1983), rev'd, 39 Cal. 3d
719, 702 P.2d 205, 216 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1985). The court of appeal found that the prohibition
of interception of subscription television applied to subscription television signals sent by MDS
and therefore the statute applied to defendants. 194 Cal. Rptr. 138-39 (1984), rev'd, 39 Cal. 3d
719, 702 P.2d 205, 216 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1985).
132. Cal. S.B. 387, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. (1984).
133. Babylon, 39 Cal. 3d at 725, 702 P.2d at 209, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
134. Id. at 727, 702 P.2d at 211, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29. The court based the reversal on
the "well-established principle that, absent a saving clause, a defendant is entitled to the benefit
of a more recent statute which mitigates the punishment for the offense or decriminalizes the
conduct altogether." Id. at 725, 702 P.2d at 209, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 127 (citing People v. Rossi,
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hibits selling any device designed "'to decode, descramble, intercept, or
otherwise make intelligible any encoded, scrambled, or other nonstandard
signal carried by that subscription television system.' "135 Because the
transmission at issue was neither encoded nor scrambled the court found
that section 593e did not apply, rejecting the prosecution's argument that
the transmissions were "nonstandard" merely because they were on a
microwave frequency.'
36
Section 593e(g) defines nonstandard signals as "includ[ing], without
limitation, any type of distorted signal or transmission that is not intended
to produce an intelligible program or service without the use of special
devices or information provided by the sender."' 137 The court concluded
that "[u]nder this definition, HBO transmissions [could] be regarded as
nonstandard only if they are distorted."'138 There was no evidence in the
case that the MDS transmission varied in waveform or was distorted in
any other way to render it unintelligible. 139 The court thus rejected the
prosecution's contention that the signal was distorted because it could
not be received in an intelligible form by a normal television set. 4 ' This
proposition, the court determined, "simply bypasses the requirement that
a 'nonstandard' signal be 'distorted' and is in no way supported by the
language of the statute."'' Based on this analysis the court concluded
that:
[T]he MDS transmission at issue was neither encoded, scram-
bled, nor otherwise "distorted" so as to render it "nonstan-
18 Cal. 3d 295, 555 P.2d 1313, 134 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1976); In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740, 408
P.2d 948, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1965)).
135. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 593e(b) (West 1980)).
136. Babylon, 39 Cal. 3d at 726, 702 P.2d at 210, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28.
137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 593e(g) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
138. Babylon, 39 Cal. 3d at 726, 702 P.2d at 210, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 127 (emphasis in origi-
nal). The court explained that a distorted signal requires some sort of alteration, modulation
or interference which makes the program unintelligible without the use of some sort of device.
It noted, basing its conclusion on various communications dictionaries and glossaries, that
with respect to signal transmissions, distortion usually involves changes in the wave form as
opposed to the wave length. Id., 702 P.2d at 210, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 128 (citing E. SMITH,
GLOSSARY OF COMMUNICATIONS (1971) ("distortion" defined as "[a]ny difference between
the wave shape of an original signal, and the wave shape after the signal has traversed the
transmission circuit")).
139. Id. at 726, 702 P.2d at 210, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
140. Id. The court stated that, under such reasoning, any microwave transmission would
have to be called distorted. This the court added, would ignore the plain meaning of the word
"distorted" which implies that something must be done to the signal. Id.
141. Id. (emphasis in original). The court noted that the use of microwaves in communica-
tions is by no means nonstandard in the sense of being rare or exotic, as they are used in radio,
telephone and television as well as radar, military communications and astronomy. Id. at 727,
702 P.2d at 210, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
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dard" as defined by the statute. Nor does the mere selection of
a microwave frequency automatically result in "nonstandard"
transmission. Accordingly. . . section 593e does not prohibit
the sale of equipment designed merely to receive in intelligible
form unencoded microwave transmissions broadcast by a mul-
tipoint distribution service.' 4 2
2. Analysis of Babylon
The California Supreme Court recognized that section 593e prohib-
its the selling of any device designed "to decode, descramble, intercept,
or otherwise make intelligible any encoded, scrambled, or other nonstan-
dard signal carried by that subscription television system."' 43 The court
focused on the "encoded, scrambled or other nonstandard signal" lan-
guage of section 593e without considering that section's parallel lan-
guage: "decode, unscramble or intercept.""' A pairing of the terms
shows that, "encoded" relates to "decode," "scrambled" relates to "un-
scrambled," and "other nonstandard signal" relates to "intercept." If
section 593e protects only scrambled signals, this last pair would seem to
be superfluous. The parallel use of terms suggests that the statute pro-
tects more than merely scrambled signals.' 45
The Babylon court equated the term "nonstandard" exclusively with
the term "distorted." Section 593e states that "[f]or the purposes of this
section . . . nonstandard signal[s] shall include, without limitation, any
type of distorted signal or transmission that is not intended to produce an
intelligible program or service without use of special devices or informa-
tion provided by the sender."' 46 The court gave section 593e(g) a narrow
reading, finding that only distorted signals could be nonstandard and ig-
nored the language stating that the definition is not limited to such
signals.
147
142. Id. (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 725, 702 P.2d at 209, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 127 (emphasis in original) (quoting CAL.
PENAL CODE § 593e (West 1980)).
144. Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 593e(a) (West 1980)).
145. This reasoning was employed by Justice Evans in the appellate opinion of Babylon.
People v. Babylon, 146 Cal. App. 3d 386, 194 Cal. Rptr. 134, rev'd, 39 Cal. 3d 719, 702 P.2d
205, 216 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1985). Although that opinion preceded the amendment of§ 593e, the
wording of the statute was similar. Justice Evans found that his conclusion had support in the
wording of the statute. He initially determined that the words "decoding" and "interception"
in the statute obviously referred to two different means of pirating signals. Moreover, Justice
Evans concluded that "interception" referred to the piracy of MDS signals and that the equip-
ment sold by the defendants was used to intercept. 194 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38.
146. CAL. PENAL CODE § 593e(g) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
147. Babylon, 39 Cal. 3d at 726, 702 P.2d at 210, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28.
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When 593e(b) and (g) are viewed together, the supreme court's in-
terpretation of the newly amended statute appears too narrow. As a re-
suit, under California law, defendants who willfully sell equipment which
they know will be used to intercept a signal without permission, will es-
cape liability. However, the person who bought the system, relying on
the seller, 4 ' will alone be subject to liability.149
3. Preemption of section 593e
In People v. Patton,151 the defendant challenged pre-amendment sec-
tion 593e on the ground that it was preempted by federal law. The court
found that section 593e was not invalid merely because it attempted to
regulate the same subject as federal law."' The court outlined four prin-
ciples which the United States Supreme Court has expressed regarding
the doctrine of preemption: (1) there should be an attempted reconcilia-
tion of federal and state statutory schemes rather than an exclusion of
one or the other; 152 (2) there will be a preemption if there is Congres-
sional intent to blanket the field, or there is a direct conflict between the
state and federal schemes, or any state intervention would burden or
frustrate the objectives or purposes of Congress; 15 3 (3) preemption should
exist to the extent required to serve the purposes and objectives of Con-
gress;15 and (4) there is preemption where state law places an unreason-
148. See supra note 1.
149. Section 593e(a) provides that anyone who:
[P]urchases, possesses, attaches, causes to be attached, assists others in or maintains
the attachment of any unauthorized device. . . to a television set. . . for the pur-
pose of intercepting, receiving, or using any program or other service carried by the
subscription television system which the person is not authorized. . . to receive or
use, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 593e(a) (West Supp. 1985). Intercepting is sufficient to impose liability
on the person who receives the signal, but not for the person who sells the intercepting device
knowing how it will be used. It is possible that Babylon and Hyatt could have been guilty
under this statute for assisting the attachment. Although the penalty for this misdemeanor is
less than the penalty for violation of § 593e(b), § 593e(a) might be a way to stop the sale of
such equipment.
150. 147 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 194 Cal. Rptr. 759 (1983).
151. Id. at 6, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
152. Id. (citing Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973)).
153. Id. (citing Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d
86, 93, 603 P.2d 1329, 1331, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735 (1979) (citing Florida Avocado Growers
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1947), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980))). The court stated that
"'[t]he controlling inquiry on the preemption issue is determining whether the state action
stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress .... Id. (quoting Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Ange-
les, 26 Cal. 3d 86, 93, 603 P.2d 1329, 1332, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735 (1979) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 57, 67 (1941), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980))).
154. Id. at 5, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 761 (citing Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City
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able burden or discrimination on interstate commerce or touches an area
of commerce which requires a uniform national rule.
155
The Patton court rejected the contention that Congress, in enacting
the Communications Act of 1934, assumed exclusive jurisdiction over
the area of communications. 156 Because section 593e prohibited the
same activity as the federal law, the court concluded that the state law
acted in furtherance of, not in conflict with or as an obstacle to, the ac-
complishment of the purposes of Congress." 7
Now that both the Cable Act and section 593e have been amended,
the question of preemption should be reexamined. Has the California
Supreme Court in Babylon construed section 593e in a way that results in
its preemption? Although Congress has not explicitly precluded state
protection,158 the state law is arguably in conflict with the federal law. '5 9
While it is possible to obey both laws by not breaking either, section
593e, as interpreted by the California Supreme Court, confuses the area
of regulation. A viewer could intercept an unscrambled MDS or STV
signal and be in violation of federal law while not in violation of state
law. A viewer who intercepts a signal that is covered by a valid market-
ing system will face the same inconsistent standards. This confusion
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."' 160 If section 593e is not an obsta-
cle, it certainly does not supplement the federal law.
of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86, 94, 603 P.2d 1329, 1332, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735 (1979) (citing
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 820 (1980))).
155. Id. at 6, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 761 (citing Greater Westchester Homeowner's Ass'n v. City
of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86, 94, 603 P.2d 1329, 1332, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735 (1979) (citing
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980)).
156. Id. at 10, 194 Cal. Rptr. 759.
157. Id.
158. See 130 CONG. REC. § 14287 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood),
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4738, 4746.
159. See supra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
160. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Note that the California Supreme Court
modified its original opinion in Babylon. In the first opinion, People v. Babylon, 39 Cal. 3d 70,
modified, 39 Cal. 3d 719, 702 P.2d 205, 216 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1985), the court reasoned that its
construction of § 593e was consistent with the recently enacted federal Cable Act. The court
used § 705(b) to support its conclusion and would not venture to say whether or not HBO was
a "marketing system" for the purposes of the Act in the absence of any federal judicial con-
struction. The court read § 705(b) as giving less protection to unencoded signals, rewarding
those who invest money in protection of the signals and protecting those who sell systems from
liability for assisting in the unauthorized use of unencoded signals. Id. at 80. The court noted
that § 705(b) of the Cable Act clearly distinguished between encoded and unencoded transmis-
sions, offering less protection to unencoded signals. Id. The modified opinion completely left
this section out. Viewing Babylon in light of Nichols and Starlink, it becomes apparent that the
federal statute treats unscrambled signals differently only within a very narrow category of
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Even if section 593e is not preempted by federal law, its utility re-
mains questionable. Now that both statutes authorize a private right of
action, so that a plaintiff can bring suit under the more protective federal
law in either state or federal court,16 1 will section 593e ever be used?' 62
In Patton, the court found that section 593e supplemented and strength-
ened federal law.' 63 Since, in effect, state law will never be used, the
statute as interpreted no longer serves this purpose.
To summarize, federal law currently protects all scrambled satellite
signals and those unscrambled satellite signals which are marketed. State
law affords somewhat less protection, encompassing only those signals
which are scrambled.
VI. REACTION TO THE CABLE ACT
A. Reaction from the Pay Television Companies
Section 705(b) presents television companies with two ways to as-
sure protection of their transmissions. One choice is to engage in a mar-
keting system. There is little legislative history to indicate what
constitutes a "marketing system" which will satisfy the section. The only
real guidance given in the legislative history of the Act is negative-a
marketing system cannot be a sham to deny access or a system to tax or
get royalties. 164
One possible marketing system which would satisfy section 705(b) is
point-of-sale licensing systems. The seller of the system would sell per-
mission to view as an agent of the companies. 165 This kind of system
could work something like the compulsory license system of the Copy-
right Act. 166 This would entail a one-time payment by each receiver into
a pool to be divided by the senders of the signals.'
67
Alternatively, some companies, such as MTV, have aired commer-
cials requesting that satellite viewers send away for their MTV license.'
68
signals-those coming directly from a satellite. Perhaps the Babylon court realized that its
construction of § 593e was not consistent with § 705.
161. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
162. When the suit in Babylon was brought, § 593e did not authorize a private right of
action. Now that both the federal and state law explicitly authorize a private right of action,
this question becomes relevant.
163. Patton, 147 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 9, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 763.
164. See 130 CONG. REC. H10446 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Tanzin).
165. Id. at H 10443 (statement of Rep. Gore).
166. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1982).
167. The fact that it would be a one-time payment might not be acceptable to the television
companies.
168. MTV offered to grant a license for a number of months for under twenty dollars and,
along with the license, the licensee would receive a MTV t-shirt. The problem with this type of
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Whether or not these forms of marketing systems will be acceptable or
feasible remains to be seen.
In fact, concern over the marketing system might prove to be irrele-
vant. This is because the second method of ensuring signal protection
under section 705(b) is to scramble the signal. The pay television compa-
nies, when faced with the alternative of developing a "marketing system"
or scrambling the signal, have chosen the latter option. On January 15,
1986, HBO and Cinemax, the two largest pay television suppliers, began
transmitting a scrambled signal.
Congress' effort to aid rural satellite dish owners created an excep-
tion to liability for unlawful signal interception. However, rather than
second guess Congress' idea of a marketing system, pay television com-
panies have scrambled all of their signals. Thus, the people whom the
exception was intended to benefit, the rural satellite dish owners, will
now have less access to the signal than they did before. These rural view-
ers, like their urban counterparts, cannot intercept and decode scrambled
signals. Congress, in an attempt to cut a slice out of the property right of
the sender, in effect gave away the whole pie. The scrambling of the
signal reclaims that taken right.
B. Reaction from Congress
Congress is attempting to react to the scrambling of the signals. In
anticipation of scrambling, bills were introduced in both houses to rem-
edy the situation created by the scrambling. One bill, entitled the "Satel-
lite Viewing Rights Act of 1985" (Satellite Act), 69 seeks to clarify the
policies regarding the right to receive satellite programming. Section 701
of the Satellite Act declares the bill's purpose is to: (1) foster widespread
availability of satellite programming; (2) ensure reasonable availability to
scrambled programming; (3) encourage competition among manufactur-
ers and distributors of equipment; and (4) provide for a method of estab-
lishing prices, terms and conditions for viewing rights. 7 '
In reality, the bill would remove the senders' right to protect their
signals by scrambling them. If a company chooses to scramble its signal,
it must allow reception to anyone who wishes to receive the signal-as
long as that person has complied with prices and conditions. 17  On its
face this proposal appears to be fair, but the sender would have no con-
system is that it depends totally on the voluntary compliance of the satellite dish owner. If the
owner does not send away for the license, there is not much the company can do.
169. H.R. 1840 & S. 1618, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
170. Id. § 701.
171. Presumably, this could work very much like cable television where the company
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trol over how the signal would be unscrambled. Proposed section 702(c)
would not allow any person's right to receive the programming to be
conditioned on the purchase or lease of unscrambling devices from spe-
cific sources. If the sender has no control over how the signal can be
unscrambled, there is little point in scrambling it in the first place. If a
satellite dish owner can purchase an unscrambler from someone other
than the sender, the only way that a sender can be compensated for the
programming is if the receiver decides to pay. This kind of "honor sys-
tem" is impractical, inefficient and unfair to the sender of the signal. 172
In effect, the Satellite Act will return the industry to where it was before
the Cable Act, with pay companies having to go after those who refuse to
pay for the signals.
If Congress' intent is to ensure that a "slice" of the property right is
vested in the receiver, it must find a way to do so without burning down
the house to save the front door.
17 3
C. Reaction from the Public and the Dish Sellers
Reaction from the public has been varied. The most direct impact
has been a decrease in sales of satellite dishes.1 74 A more sensational
reaction was an antic by someone calling himself "Captain Midnight."
On April 27, 1986, a Home Box Office broadcast of the movie "The Fal-
con and the Snowman" was interrupted by a message which read:
"Goodevening HBO from Captain Midnight. $12.95 a month? No way!
(Showtime-Movie Channel Beware)."' 175 This intruder replaced the HBO
signal with his own to protest the scrambling.
76
charges per service received or for the whole package. A pay-per-view system could only work
if descramblers are sophisticated enough to vary the scrambling and descrambling.
172. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
173. Congress has also introduced a bill which would place a two-year moratorium on
scrambling of signals. H.R. 1769, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The purpose of this bill is to
allow the receivers to get for free what Congress is trying to get them to pay for. When the
moratorium ends, and these receivers have to pay for the programming, there will probably be
screams from the dish owners that they should not have to pay for something that has always
been free. It would be better psychologically to allow the companies to continue scrambling
the signals until the system giving access to the dish owners is established.
174. See Pay-TV Scrambling Hurts Dish Makers, L.A. Times, June 5, 1985, pt. 2, at 1, col.
2. Some industry sources said that sales in 1986 were as much as 70% off from the previous
year. Id.
175. Video Pirate Disrupts Movie on HBO With a Message, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1986, at
17, col. 1.
176. The intruder was eventually caught, but not before a bill was introduced to stiffen the
penalties for this kind of technological terrorism. The "Satellite Communications Protection
Act of 1986" would impose a prison term of up to ten years and a fine of up to $250,000. See
Captain Midnight Bill Targets Signal Interruption, Variety, June 11, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
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The most vocal representative of the satellite dish industry is the
Society for Private and Commercial Earth Stations (SPACE). Recently
SPACE has taken a softer position on the issue of scrambling than it had
earlier. SPACE has taken the position that it never publicly opposed the
scrambling of signals per se, as long as the consumer could receive the
signals at a fair price.17 7 However, SPACE is still insisting that parties
other than the programmers sell signals to the dish owners. 178
D. A Proposal for Compromise
In order to ensure survival of the product a compromise must be
reached which will balance the sender's property right and the receiver's
right of access. In order to reach a compromise, Congress must rework
the proposed bill. Congress' plan is to take away the sender's right to
totally exclude a potential satellite receiver, even one who is willing to
pay. If Congress intends to reach its goal by forcing pay television com-
panies to market their scrambled signals, Congress must allow the com-
panies to control the unscrambling.
What Congress has done has been to defer to the FCC. On August
7, 1986, the FCC launched an inquiry to examine the effects of scram-
bling. 179 This inquiry is a result of Congressional resistance to giving any
legislative aid to the satellite dish industry.' 80 As one source was quoted
as saying: "Adopting legislation to rescue home dishes will ultimately
result in more legislation to rescue some other industry. There is no end
to this once it starts."
1 8'
The FCC's inquiry will most likely have one of two results. First
will be a decision to do nothing. This would be in deference to the mar-
ketplace. There is support for this result among signal providers. In a
speech to SPACE, Stephan Win. Schulte, Showtime Senior Vice-Presi-
dent of direct broadcast development, called scrambling a "dead is-
177. SPACE makes its case, Broadcast, June 2, 1986, at 80.
178. Id. This creates the same problem of enforcement discussed supra at notes 164-68 and
accompanying text.
179. See FCCponders signal scrambling issue, The Hollywood Rep., Aug. 8, 1986, at 1, col.
2. The FCC will seek information on the development of descrambling equipment, the mar-
keting plans of channels, competition among the different carriers such as cable and satellite
providers and the public benefit of scrambling. Id. at 7, col. 2. Another interesting topic that
the FCC is seeking comment on is whether scrambling treats copyright owners fairly by pro-
viding them with control over their intellectual property. Id. The discussion of policy and the
resulting proposals of this Comment should show how scrambling cannot help but benefit
copyright owners.
180. See Industry, Congress resist any legislative aid to dish owners, The Hollywood Rep.,
June 13, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
181. Cooper, Scrambling Woes, Radio-Electronics, July 1980, at 78.
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sue." ' The reasons for this conclusion were as follows: (1) all of the
major providers had already scrambled, (2) consumers are aware of the
scrambling, and (3) programmers are starting to market the signals
competitively. 183
The second possible result of the inquiry will be the promulgation of
rules regulating the scrambling and unscrambling of signals. If the FCC
takes its cue from Congress' concerns in enacting both the Cable Act and
proposing the Satellite Act, the Commission will hopefully seek to bal-
ance the concerns of the parties.
Section 703 of the Satellite Act authorizes the FCC to establish
prices, terms and conditions for viewing rights.184 There is no reason
why the FCC cannot also control the way in which the signals are un-
scrambled. The FCC could allow the pay television companies to own
and lease out the scramblers to the satellite dish owners. The FCC
would then develop rules which would control the prices and availability
of the descramblers. The pay television company would not be allowed
to charge an unreasonable price for the leasing of an unscrambler. If
unreasonable charges were made, in effect precluding access, the FCC
could establish maximum prices that could be charged.
This system could work in much the same way that pay television
companies control reception over cable. Through the cable operator, the
pay television company collects a fee for .the service. No one has com-
plained that the cable companies have retained control over the unscram-
bling of their signals.1 5 The principle is the same-if a satellite dish
owner wishes to receive the pay service, she will rent the unscrambler
and pay for the service. The satellite viewer would then have the same
opportunity as the cable viewer to view the programming.
One way to determine the reasonableness of the fee is to compare it
to the fee charged for cable service. In Los Angeles, one cable service
charges $17.86 per month for a basic package.1 86 Perhaps, some of the
182. Scrambling a 'dead issue' Showtime vp Schulte says, The Hollywood Rep., July 2, 1986,
at 11, col. 2.
183. Id. This final reason might be the most important. Showtime-The Movie Channel has
enlisted the aid of six satellite equipment distributors to tell dish owners how to purchase
decoders and subscribe to the services. See S/TMC Signs Six Dish Firms In Decoder Push,
Variety, July 7, 1986, at 8, col. 5.
184. H.R. 1840 & S. 1618, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 702 (1985).
185. The satellite dish owners have of course been up in arms. One owner was quoted as
saying: "It's just plain wrong . . . . I know they've got the argument that they own the
program, but they don't own the sky." Scrambling of Signals Today Thwarts TV Dish Anten-
nas, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
186. Prices in this discussion obtained from telephone interview with a sales representative
from Communicom Cable in Los Angeles (Mar. 17, 1986).
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services in this package would be scrambled,' 87 so a percentage of the
basic fee could be charged to satellite dish owners for services which are
available on basic cable. The cable company also charges separately for
special pay services such as HBO and Showtime.18 8 There is no reason
why the fees for satellite descrambling of the signal should be any less.
The charge could be adjusted to compensate for the rental of the un-
scrambler. This seems reasonable because the satellite owner, unlike the
cable subscriber, is not having to pay for basic cable in order to have
access to the pay channels. '89
Assuming the goal is to give the rural viewer the same opportunity
to receive the same programming as those who live in areas serviced by
cable, this method would achieve such a result. The receiver would have
a right to access, but the right would be conditioned on payment. The
sender would have a limited right to exclude by not furnishing the un-
scrambled signal to those unwilling to pay. 9 ' If there is another goal,
that of helping the fledgling satellite industry compete with the more es-
tablished cable television industry, it has not been articulated.
VII. CONCLUSION
Once it is established that television signals are a resource worth
protecting, it only makes sense to allow the sender to protect them. The
advent of satellite dishes created a new way around that protection. This
opening up of the airwaves necessitated the creation of a technological
padlock-scrambling. This lock, however, must be used with discretion.
This discretion, if not created by the natural forces of the marketplace
should be imposed by Congress, the courts or the FCC.
New technologies create new tensions in society. Those tensions, in
turn, create a need for resolutions by either the parties involved or by
third parties. The satellite viewing rights dilemma has the senders and
the receivers at war. If the participants cannot find the answer in the
marketplace, others will step in. If Congress, the courts or the FCC step
in to settle the dispute, they will have to carefully balance the needs of all
187. For example, MTV is offered on some basic cable systems, but is also being scrambled.
188. Communicom charges $11.50 for one pay service, $20.00 for two pay services, and
$27.00 for three pay services.
189. Communicom also charges an installation fee and deposit totaling $56.45.
190. An interesting corollary issue, which has not been discussed, is whether these new
amendments would apply to commercial television signals. Commercial stations, tiring of sat-
ellite dish owners intercepting feeds, have started motions to scramble those feeds. This
scrambling is especially upsetting to sports viewers, who use their dishes to receive sports
programming from around the world-even programming which is specifically blacked out in
their city. See The Scrambling Dilemma, L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 1986, pt. 3, at 10, col. 6.
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concerned. A tip of the scale too far in one direction will cut off all
access to the resource. A tip of the scale too far the other way will cause
the resource to perish.
Robert D. Haymer

